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NOTES 
LABOR LAW-Two Views of a Labor Relations Consultant's 
Duty To Report Under Section 203 of the LMRDA 
Title II of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act (LMRDA)1 requires unions, union officials, union employees, 
employers and "labor relations consultants" to file various reports 
with the Secretary of Labor. The purpose of these provisions is to 
discourage corrupt, though not necessarily illegal, labor manage-
ment activities by disclosing them for public scrutiny.2 Section 
203(b) of the Act,3 which is aimed at the "labor relations con-
1. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). Since reference will be made 
throughout this note to different bills and committee reports, it may be helpful to 
set down an abbreviated chronological history of the Act. In 1958, shortly after the 
McClellan Committee Report, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), which 
dealt with corruption and other illegal activities in the area of labor-management re-
lations, the Senate passed the Kennedy-Ives Bill, S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 
but it never came to a vote in the House. The following year, Senators Kennedy and 
Ervin introduced S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which was consolidated with 
several others by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and reported 
out as S. 1555 in S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). After lengthy debate and 
amendments from the floor, the Senate passed S. 1555. Meanwhile, in the House, after 
considering several bills, the Committee on Education and Labor favorably reported 
out H.R. 8342 in H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). However, during 
debate in the House, H.R. 8342 was amended so as to substitute the text of another 
bill, H.R. 8400 (the Landrum-Griflin Bill) and it was passed in that form. The Senate-
House Conference Committee included Senator Kennedy and Representatives Landrum 
and Griffin, the chief architects of the two bills, and the differences between the 
Senate and House versions were alleviated. The findings and actions of the conference 
committee were reported to the respective bodies by S. Doc. No. 51, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1959) and H.R. REP. No. _1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The bill which 
emerged from the Conference Committee, now called the "Landrum-Griffin Bill," was 
passed by both the House and the Senate and was signed into law by the President. 
See, I U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 vii-xi (1959) [hereinafter cited 
as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (NLRB)]. 
2. As stated in S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY (NLRB) 412: 
there are three reasons for relying upon the milder sanction of reporting and 
disclosure to eliminate improper conflicts of interest: (I) the searchlight of pub-
licity is a strong deterrent. • . . Before adopting extreme measures it is wise to 
see whether milder sanctions are sufficient. (2) The requirements of reporting and 
disclosure will help the labor unions to better regulate their own affairs •••• 
(3) The reports would furnish a strong factual basis for further action in the 
event that other legislation is required. 
See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 851, 878 (1960). 
3. LMRDA § 203(b), 73 Stat. 527 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1964) provides: 
(b) Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an em• 
ployer undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly-
(!) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade em-
ployees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing; or 
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of em-
ployees or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving 
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sultant,"4 states that "every person" who agrees with an employer 
to "directly or indirectly" (1) "persuade employees" regarding their 
right to organize and bargain collectively or (2) inform the em-
ployer of certain union-employee activities must file within thirty 
days of the agreement a report containing "a detailed statement of 
the terms and conditions of such agreement." Section 203(b) further 
requires "every such person" to file an annual report setting out 
his "receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor rela-
tions advice or services and their sources" and his disbursements 
"in connection with these services." 
Standing alone, this language seems to indicate that any person 
who has engaged in "persuader activities" or acted as an informant 
pursuant to an agreement with an employer should include in his 
annual report all receipts and disbursements in connection with 
advice or services rendered to any employer. However, section 203(c) 
of the Act5 provides that "nothing in this section [203] shall be 
construed to require any employer or other person to file a report 
covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or agree-
ing to give advice to such employer .... " Neither the language6 
nor the legislative history7 of this section reveals clearly how sub-
section (c)'s exemption provision with respect to advice is to be 
1ttch employer, except information for use solely in conjunction with an admin-
istrative or arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial proceeding; 
shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or arrangement a 
report with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding 
principal officers, containing the name under which such person is engaged in 
doing business and the address of its principal office, and a detailed statement 
of the terms and conditions of such agreement or arrangement. Every such person 
shall file annually, with respect to each fiscal year during which payments were 
made as a result of such agreement or arrangement, a report with the Secretary, 
signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers, contain-
ing a statement (A) of it receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor 
relations' advice or services, designating the sources thereof, and (B) of its dis-
bursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof 
In each such case such information shall be set forth in such categories as the 
Secretary may prescribe. 
4. The Act defines a "labor relations consultant" as "any person who, for compen-
sation, advises or represents an employer, employer organization, or labor organiza-
tions concerning employee organizing, concerted activities, or collective bargaining 
activities." LMRDA § 3(m), 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1964). 
5. LMRDA § 203(c), 73 Stat. 527 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1964) provides: 
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or other 
person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving 
or agreeing to give advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to repre-
sent such employer before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbi-
tration or engaging or agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such 
employer with respect to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder. 
6. Perhaps it is not surprising that inconsistencies and ambiguities appear, for it 
has been stated that "the bill itself was very much a scissors and paste job • • • 
written between sunset and sunup." Roosevelt, LMRDA in the Congressional Arena, 
in SYMPOSIUM ON THE l.ABOR•MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 
127 (Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM]. 
7. See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra. 
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reconciled with subsection (b)'s reporting requirements. Possible 
interpretations of subsection (c) are that it (I) excludes the report-
ing of any and all advice given by a labor relations consultant, 
including that given to an employer in connection with reportable 
subsection (b) "persuader activities"; (2) excludes the reporting of 
advice if, and only if, no reportable subsection (b) "persuader activ-
ities" have been performed by the consultant for any employer, 
that is, if the consultant does nothing but give advice to any em-
ployer; or (3) excludes only the reporting of the advice given to an 
employer with whom there is no reportable subsection (b) persua-
sion agreement. 8 
Two recent cases, involving similar factual situations, have posed 
this interpretative question to the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits.9 In both cases, attorneys who were engaged in 
general labor-relations practice undertook "persuader activities" 
for an employer-client by explaining to assembled groups of em-
ployees legal questions involved in pending representation elec-
tions.10 Both attorneys were ordered by the Secretary of Labor to 
report not only the terms, conditions, receipts, and disbursements 
relative to these "persuader activities," but also the names of all of 
their labor-relations clients and all receipts and disbursements in 
connection with these clients, regardless of the nature of advice or 
services performed for them. Both attorneys sought declaratory judg-
ments against the Secretary of Labor, claiming protection under 
8. In noting the imprecise effect of §§ 203(b) and (c), Professor Aaron commented, 
"This is another example of the ambiguities produced by the inartistic draftsmanship 
which characterizes much of the statute." Aaron, supra note 2, at 891. See also Loomis, 
Employer and Consultant Reporting Requirements, in SYMPOSIUM 391, 398. 
The first of the three possible interpretations mentioned in the text has not been 
adopted by any appellate court. This interpretation is clearly the least desirable of 
the three, for as a matter of statutory construction, it would eliminate the word "ad-
vice" from subsection (b)'s reporting requirements. Moreover, this interpretation would 
largely thwart the statutory purpose of "floodlighting" those "persuader agreements" 
deemed by Congress to be in the "gray area." See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra. 
9. Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966), 
vacating 232 F. Supp. 348 (M.D.N.C. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Douglas]; Wirtz v. 
Fowler, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1f 11514 (5th Cir. 1966), reversing on other grounds 236 F. 
Supp. 22 (S.D. Fla. 1964) (A rehearing en bane is pending) [hereinafter cited as Fowler]. 
10. In Douglas, the attorney made three speeches in which he explained legal 
issues. While the attorney was doubtful that these speeches encompassed "persuader 
activities," the point was conceded for purposes of this litigation. 232 F. Supp. at 350. 
In Fowler, the attorney spoke before assembled groups of employees and also ques-
tioned employees individually with respect to unfair labor practice charges filed against 
the employers. The lower court held that these were not "persuader activities" since 
the attorney was fully disclosed as the employer's agent. The District Court thus ac-
cepted the argument that prior disclosure insulates the "labor consultant" from any 
reporting requirement at all. 236 F. Supp. at 33-34. In rejecting this theory, the Fifth 
Circuit correctly noted that the reporting provision would be emasculated if a labor 
relations consultant could insulate himself from all reporting requirements merely by 
disclosing that he was an agent of the employer. Congress obviously wanted more 
information than mere identification or it would not have enacted § 203(b). 
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section 203(c). The Fourth Circuit, in Douglas v. Wirtz,U sustained 
the Secretary's order by adopting the second of the above-mentioned 
interpretations. The court reasoned that in order to reconcile the 
statutory provisions, subsection (c)'s advice exemption must be con-
strued to mean that a report of services is not required ("triggered") 
where the consultant only gives advice. Thus, by construing the 
words "by reason of" as relating back to "report" and as meaning 
"because of," it read section 203(c) as if it said "no employer or 
other person shall be required to file a report because of his giving 
or agreeing to give advice .... " However, the court held that once 
the consultant goes beyond the giving of advice, that is, once he 
engages in any "persuasion activity," he is no longer within subsec-
tion (c)'s exemption and must thereafter report all advice and ser-
vices given to all employer-clients. The Fifth Circuit, in Wirtz v. 
Fowler,12 conceded that the Douglas reading may be supported by the 
syntax of section 203(c), but, in light of the other statutory provi-
sions and the legislative history and purposes of the LMRDA, it 
concluded that the third of the above-mentioned interpretations was 
the most proper. This court tacitly read "by reason of" as relating 
not to "report" but to "services," and as meaning "consisting of" 
rather than "because of." Thus, it interpreted section 203(c) as say-
ing that a consultant need not report services consisting solely of 
advice, even if he engages in persuasion activities with other em-
ployers.13 
Although both the Douglas and Fowler courts attempt to read 
section 203(c)'s advice exemption in a manner which can be recon-
ciled with the language of section 203(b), the Douglas approach has 
several serious shortcomings. First, it eliminates from the statute the 
words "covering the services of such person." More important, in 
construing the exemption to mean only that the giving of advice 
alone does not give rise to a duty to report, the Douglas court makes 
section 203(c) a mere repetition of what was already clear under sec-
tion 203(b). While it is apparent that in a given factual situation 
there may be some question as to where the precise line is drawn 
between nonreportable "advice" and reportable "indirect persua-
sion," the terms would seem to be mutually exclusive.14 In the con-
11. 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966). 
12. 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 1f 11514 (5th Cir. 1966). 
l!I. The only other case found which presents the issue herein supports the Doug-
las view. See Price v. Wirtz, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 1f 19555 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 1965), appeal 
docketed, No. 22630, 5th Cir. June 1, 1965. 
14. See Bernstein 8: Sullivan, Lawyer Reporting and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
in SYMPOSIUM 410, 414: 
A reasonable construction of 'advice' would hold it applicable to all activities of 
the lawyer in which it is contemplated that the client will be the ultimate im-
plementing actor • • • [and] would not include activities in which the lawyer 
or his agent implement the activity by interdisposition between the client and 
his employees • • • • 
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text of section 203, "persuasion" connotes influencing the actions 
of a group without their knowledge, whereas "advice" involves in-
fluencing the actions of a paying client with his knowledge. Since 
under subsection (b) neither a thirty-day nor an annual report is 
required unless there has been "persuasion," the Douglas approach 
appears to reduce subsection (c) to the truism that the non-report-
able giving of advice does not give rise to a duty to report.15 Such 
a narrow construction of the subsection would appear to be incon-
sistent with the House Conference Committee's statement that sec-
tion 203(c) "grants a broad exemption from the requirements of the 
section with respect to the giving of advice."16 Finally, the Douglas 
court assumed that "advice" in subsection (b)'s requirement for the 
reporting of advice in the annual report must embrace "independent 
advice" that is "apart from statutory persuasion." Consequently, it 
believed that if subsection (c) were construed to exempt any advice 
from the reporting requirement when a report was required, sub-
section (b)'s reporting of advice requirement would be rendered 
meaningless. However, the Douglas court's underlying assumption 
may be questioned since subsection (b) calls for a thirty-day report 
containing all the terms of an employer-consultant agreement when 
"an object" of the agreement is persuasion, and therefore if an agree-
ment contemplates both advice and persuasion, this advice is clearly 
reportable. With this in mind, section 203(b) may be read as requir-
ing an annual report covering such advice, that is, advice which is 
collateral to a particular persuasion agreement, while section 203(c) 
exempts all advice which is not so related to persuader activity. 
The Fowler court in effect adopted this approach and took an 
additional step, saying that advice given to a persuader employer 
should be reported even if that advice was unrelated to the persua-
sion activity. While this step was not necessary for a reconciliation 
of the advice provisions of sections 203(b) and 203(c), it is consistent 
with both the purposes and the underlying policy considerations of 
the statute.17 Furthermore, it seems to be justified by the language 
in section 203(b) requiring a report as to "receipts of any kind from 
employers." The Douglas court reasoned that the plural terminology 
("employers") evinces a congressional intent that the annual report 
cover all employers with whom the labor relations consultant has 
dealt, regardless of the nature of the dealings. However, since the 
section contemplates several thirty-day reports during the year cov-
15. The District Court in Fowler recognized that this would be the logical result 
of the Secretary's position, although the court did not reach this question since it 
decided that no reportable "persuader activities" took place. Fowler v. Wirtz, 236 F. 
Supp. 22, 34 n.4 (S!D. Fla. 1964) (dictum). 
16. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY (NLRB) 937 (Emphasis added.) 
17. See text accompanying notes 23-30 infra. 
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ering each of the separate employer arrangements,18 the use of the 
plural form can just as readily indicate a congressional intent that 
the annual report cover all employers with whom "persuader activ-
ity" agreements were made over the preceding year. Similarly, "re-
ceipts of any kind" may be harmoniously interpreted to refer to 
receipts for any nonpersuader activities which may have been per-
formed on behalf of an employer-client for whom persuader activi-
ties were also performed. 
The legislative history of sections 203(b) and 203(c) also support 
the Fowler interpretation. Senate Bill 1555, the precursor of the 
LMRDA, originally required the consultant to make only one re-
port, to be submitted annually.19 This report was to be triggered in 
the same manner as the present thirty-day report, but was to c-ontain 
all the information which is now required in both the thirty-day and 
annual reports. The section 203(c) exemption followed the report-
ing provision.20 Then, in order to inform employees quickly and 
effectively of the identity of the consultant and the details of report-
able arrangements, the Senate advanced the submission date of the 
report to thirty days after the date of the agreement.21 However, the 
conference committee, apparently recognizing that the reporting of 
some of this information within such a short time period would be 
impractical, placed the receipts and disbursements components of 
the report back on an annual basis.22 The sole concern of the con-
ferees appears to have been the timing of the reports. There is noth-
ing to indicate that they intended the "new" annual report to in-
clude transactions not covered by the previous combined report. 
Nor is there anything to indicate that it was their intention to create 
an annual report to which the exemption of section 203(c) would not 
apply. Yet the Douglas opinion applies section 203(b)'s annual re-
porting requirements to transactions not included in the thirty-day 
report and construes section 203(c)'s exemption as applicable only 
to the triggering of the thirty-day report. 
The Fowler approach is also more consistent with the statutory 
purposes which are evident from the other provisions of Title II. 
First, examination of Title II reveals that Congress has provided for 
a mutuality of reporting requirements: where a reportable trans-
action occurs, the parties on both sides are under a duty to report.23 
18. Section 203(b) states that when a person enters into a "persuader" agreement, 
he "shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement. • • ." If more 
than one agreement is made, a separate report is required for each; the thirty-day 
report is excluded from the general timing provisions of § 207(b). 
19. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (NLRB) 338, 351. 
20. Id. at 352. 
21. 2 id. at 1122-23. 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY (NLRB) 937. 
23. For example, both parties to the transaction must report when a loan is made 
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The House Report on the final conference bill24 states that section 
203(b) requires a consultant to report on "activities that ... must 
be reported by the employer" and that section 203(d) "makes it clear 
that reports are required only where an expenditure ... or agree-
ment ... " has been made. Since section 203(d)25 explicitly states 
that neither an employer nor a consultant is required to report "un-
less he has made . . . an arrangement of the kind described" [per-
suader agreement], the nonpersuader employers in Fowler and 
Douglas are clearly not obligated to report. Thus, the Douglas ap-
proach of requiring attorneys to report when their employer-clients 
have clearly been exempted destroys what appears to be the inten-
tional mutuality requirement underlying the reporting provisions. 
Second, and of greater significance, is the fact that the Douglas hold-
ing contravenes the avowed congressional intent to protect the at-
torney-client relationship to the extent that the lawyer's activities 
do not cross the line between nonreportable "advice" and reportable 
"indirect persuasion."26 Section 204,27 which exempts an attorney 
by an employer to a union officer or employee, LMRDA §§ 202(a)(6), 203(a)(l), 73 Stat. 
526, 29 U.S.C. §§ 432(a)(6), 433(a), when a labor-relations consultant makes a payment 
to a union, LMRDA §§ 202(a)(6), 203(b), 73 Stat. 526, 527, 29 U.S.C. §§ 432(a)(6), 433(b), 
and when a labor relations consultant and an employer enter into a "persuader agree-
ment," LMRDA §§ 203(b), 203(a)(4), 73 Stat. 527, 525, 29 U.S.C. §§ 433(b), 433(a)(4). 
24. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLA· 
TIVE HISTORY (NLRB) 936-37. 
25. LMRDA § 203(d), 73 Stat. 527 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 433(d) (1964) provides: 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require an employer to 
file a report under subsection (a) unless he has made an expenditure, payment, 
loan, agreement, or arrangement of the kind described therein. Nothing contained 
in this section shall be construed to require any other person to file a report 
under subsection (b) unless he was a party to an agreement or arrangement of 
the kind described therein. 
26. In proposing what is now § 204, Senator Goldwater stated on the floor of the 
Senate that "there should be a perpetuation of the sanctity of relations between the 
attorney and client. I know that if I were involved in a situation in which an attorney 
was representing me, and a report had to be made, I would not want all the intimate 
details of communications between the attorney and me to become public property." 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORT· 
ING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, at 535 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
(LABOR)]. The House counterpart to this section (H.R. 8342) protected and exempted 
both communications to and from an attorney and was explained in H.R. REP. No. 
741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (LABOR) 577, as 
"protect[ing] the traditional confidential relationship between attorney and client 
from any infringement or encroachment under the reporting provisions of the com-
mittee bill." While the Conference Committee adopted the Senate version in which 
only communications to the attorney were exempt, the House Conference Report, 
H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959), indicates that the compromise was 
not intended to weaken the bona-fide attorney-client relationship; indeed, specific 
reference was made to § 203(c)'s protection of what may be considered those legitimate 
areas of labor relations practice, that is, advice, representation, and negotiation. It 
seems clear that the House version attempted to protect too much and that it would 
have opened up too great a loophole in the reporting requirements. It is not con-
tended here that Congress intended to protect all attorney-client relationships, but 
rather that it wished to protect those which do not fall in the "reprehensible" cate-
gory. 
27. LMRDA § 204, 73 Stat. 527 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 434 (1964) provides: "Nothing 
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from reporting "any information which was lawfully communicated 
to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate 
attorney-client relationship," was enacted as an express reinforce-
ment of the protection which arguably was already provided by sec-
tion 203(c).28 Where a client has not instituted litigation, disclosure 
of the client's name and the amount of fees paid by him to his at-
torney are protected by the attorney-client privilege;29 the privilege 
is not absolute, but rather depends upon a balancing of the rights 
of the client against the purpose for which disclosure is sought.30 
However, even assuming that this common law "balancing" test is 
not displaced by the express language of section 204, it appears that 
the disclosure required by Douglas would not substantially promote 
the underlying purposes of the LMRDA and would therefore be in-
sufficient to override the attorney-client privilege. 
The LMRDA was precipitated by the "McClellan Committee's" 
extensive forays into the murky area of union corruption and labor-
management relations, which focused attention, inter alia, on the 
so-called "middlemen," including some lawyers, who performed var-
ious undercover services in and among the employees on behalf of 
the employer.31 It is these activities, designed to frustrate and cor-
rupt legitimate unionization, that Congress sought to expose to the 
contained in this chapter shall be construed to require an attorney who is a member 
in good standing of the bar of any State, to include in any report required to be 
filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter any information which was lawfully 
communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate 
attorney-client relationship." 
28. See Bernstein &: Sullivan, Lawyer Reporting and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
in Sn.ll'OSIUM 415-16, for the view that § 204 is virtually meaningless since § 203(c) 
excludes the "only area in which it [§ 204] may be employed." Senator Kennedy, in 
accepting the § 204 amendment, stated: "There is no doubt in my mind that the bill 
which was originally drafted by lawyers adequately protected them. Therefore I do 
not feel that the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona [§ 204] is wholly 
necessary. But in order that there may be no question about it, I will accept the 
amendment." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY {LABOR) 536. 
29. Where litigation is commenced on behalf of an undisclosed client, it is gener-
ally held that the attorney must disclose the name of his client. People v. ·warden, 
150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 
1059 (1934). The policy reason underlying this partial breach of the attorney-client 
relationship is that "every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his 
opponents." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313 (rev. ed. McNaughton 1961). But where dis-
closure is sought and the client has not brought suit, that is, where the attorney is 
called before the court to force disclosure, then it has been held the privilege extends 
to disclosure of names and, a fortiori, the amount of fees paid. Baird v. Koerner, 279 
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 
(1960). See generally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 94 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-
91, 2311-13 (rev; ed. McNaughton 1961). 
30. Baird v. Koerner, supra note 29; In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 
1961). 
31. Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
or Management Field [McClellan Committee], S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1958). 
760 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
public gaze. Recognizing that the "floodlighting" could not, from a 
practical standpoint, be pinpointed precisely and that some "not 
illegal" activities may be involved, the Senate Labor Committee 
stated that "since most of them are disruptive of harmonious labor 
relations and fall into a gray area ... if an employer or a consultant 
indulges in them, they should be reported."32 However, the Douglas 
view would "floodlight" not only the illegal and "gray area" prac-
tices, but also a vast area of legitimate and private relationships. The 
Secretary of Labor argues that this, in fact, was what Congress in-
tended: that once a person is knmvn to engage in "persuader activi-
ties," all of his relationships with any employer become immediately 
suspect.33 Although certain language in the committee reports does 
seem to support this view, tl).is language is ambiguous, and may be 
read just as consistently with the Fowler approach.34 The Secretary 
argues that broad exposure would "make it more difficult to conceal 
the details of the clearly reprehensible activities" by facilitating "the 
Secretary's check as to the accuracy of the reports filed,"35 but it is 
difficult to visualize the value of this additional information. Clearly 
it would not facilitate any cross-correlation as to the name of the 
persuader, the terms and conditions of the agreement, or the dis-
bursements under it, since these elements of the several reports 
would not bear any necessary relationship to other clients. The re-
ceipts element would permit compilation and comparison and would 
perhaps suggest unreported receipts or disbursements, but, since 
section 203(d) exempts non-persuader employers from reporting, it 
does not appear that the hurdles for a determinedly elusive "consul-
tant" have been greatly heightened. 
On the other hand, the impact on the attorney-client relation-
ship could be substantial. First, forcing an attorney to divulge the 
names of his clients and the amount of the fees paid by them for 
32. s. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY (NLRB) 408. 
33. Brief for Appellant, p. 10, Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965). See 
also Bernstein & SuIIivan, supra note 14, at 415, concurring in this argument. 
34. The Secretary chiefly relies on the language of S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 12 (1959), where the committee, speaking of § 203(c), states: 
An attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice, taking part 
in collective bargaining and appearing in court or administrative proceedings 
would not be included among those required to file reports under this subsection 
[b]. Specific exemption for persons giving this type of advice is contained in sub-
section (c) of section [203]. 
l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (NLRB) 408. (Emphasis added.) The Secretary argues that this 
means that one must "confine himself" to giving advice in order to take advantage 
of § 203(c). However, the committee report does not say that an attorney who does 
not "confine himself" to wholly non-persuader activities is unable to take advantage 
of any part of subsection (c). Furthermore, this language does not indicate the extent 
or nature of the information which a persuader report must include; it merely states 
that a report may be required if the lawyer undertakes a "persuader activity." 
35. Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-18, Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965). 
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legitimate services may place the attorney in an ethical dilemma 
where he had previously promised to maintain the client's privacy. 
Moreover, the client may be seriously prejudiced. For example, dis-
closure of the fact that the employer has expended large fees for 
defending himself against unfair labor practice allegations or for 
negotiating a labor contract could be utilized by the union as a bar-
gaining wedge in future negotiations. Furthermore, where once a 
confidential relationship existed, the client now finds himself sub-
ject to intensive investigation not only by agents of the Department 
of Labor, but also perhaps by the Internal Revenue Service.36 While 
such investigations certainly should not be thwarted where they are 
appropriate, the conversion of a lawful transaction into an investi-
gatory touch-off point is an unwarranted burden on even the most 
legitimate businessman. Finally, the burden on the labor lawyer is 
substantial. When asked to perform activities which might fall un-
der section 203(b), the attorney must be prepared not only for the 
formidable task of allocating all of his expenses and disbursements 
w~~~~~~~b~~~~~~~~ 
exposing his other clients to public scrutiny and perhaps losing them 
as clients. On the other hand, if he refuses to take this risk, he may 
well lose his persuader client. If the pursuasion activity involved 
is not illegal, there appears to be no justification for placing such a 
heavy burden on the attorney. 
In light of the purposes of Title II, the legislative history of the 
reporting provisions, and policy considerations, the approach taken 
by the Fifth Circuit in Fowler is clearly preferable to that taken by 
the Fourth Circuit in Douglas. 
36. See Schmidt, Income Tax Implications of LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM 420. 
